Agenda item

To consider item 9

Minutes:

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that the Service had invested a significant amount of time and resource to ensure the necessary improvements across 34 recommendations that were reportable to the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) from the Phase one inquiry had been managed. From a protection perspective, the Service had responded to its legislative requirements and officers continued to monitor and regulate high rise buildings as appropriate.

 

In terms of Phase two, the current understanding of the recommendations was that most of them were directed towards fire and rescue services and were almost confirmation of Phase one actions. They were, for example, asking HMICFRS to look at London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) response to Phase one and if LFB had implemented the things that were required of them at that stage.

There were some other recommendations that were new for consideration. Officers were starting to put some internal governance around the Phase two recommendations and were also awaiting further understanding from the NFCC in terms of reporting requirements nationally.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development assured Members that across its service delivery of prevention, protection and response, the Service was doing everything in its gift and responsibility to make buildings safe, and if they do have fires, staff were operationally prepared, and operational competent as best they could be to deal with them.

 

A Member asked that his thanks be put on record to everyone from Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service in getting the Authority to the position it was in now.

 

A Member felt that one of the extraordinary things was the provision of water and how London Fire Brigade understood where and what hydrants it had. Where was this Service in determining whether it knew where all its hydrants were for the provision of water.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that the Service had already looked at water provision, and the understanding was that there were some training gaps at that time in London Fire Brigade that do not exist in this Service. Adequate training was provided for new starters around water provision and there were also online training packages available for staff that should be renewed when appropriate. The SSRI information that the Service holds on its high-rise premises, maps out exactly where the hydrants were, and indeed also the dry risers should they be needed.

 

A Member asked about airwave, fire ground radios and communication in high-rise buildings.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that communications was one of the complexities around high-rise buildings as found with Grenfell. Airwave and fire ground radios, both had slightly different challenges in high rise buildings. Airwave was the multi agency interaction with Fire Control. Fire ground radios were for commanders and teams on scene. Fire ground radios had been procured in collaboration with Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Service may join in that procurement exercise at a later date. They had functionality to be either analogue or digital which certainly the science and the evidence at the moment suggests that digital had a greater chance of being successful in those environments.

 

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised Members that whilst the emergency services network programme was in a state of hiatus at present, the Service still had close links with the programme team and coverage was one of the most important pieces being looked at. The National programme team were testing various scenarios.

 

A Member asked about learning and how to implement that learning at the Fire Service College.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised there was a clear link between operational preparedness, competence and operational learning. Gap analysis had been undertaken against all fire standards that oversee those three response areas and were comfortable where we were as a Service. At lot of work had been undertaken around the Operational Assurance Improvement Plan, and also just launched internally was a consultation on a revised operational learning framework aligned to the fire standard.

 

A Member asked about risk assessment and who would be informing the residents who live in these buildings, was it something readily done, planned for, how was it done.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that hopefully the report gave an indication of some of the prevention work that was being done and continued to be done around this. There was a lot of work done initially after the incident to visit high rise residential properties and offer support to residents and home fire safety checks to residents. Members could also help by signposting people to information on the Service’s website about lots of prevention areas and of course, some dedicated to living in high rise properties.

The Chairman noted the Service was supporting a colleague in getting a fire engineering degree but was it a one-person capability at present. Was there a plan of how this would be made an embedded capability with the Service, i.e. more people doing it.

 

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that for the size of this Service, it was important to balance demand versus capability. It was a four year commitment for the officer that was currently undertaking it. It was something to look at from a Thames Valley perspective, as there was not the capability in the other two services.

 

The Chairman advised was there a growing risk with all these Inquiries and recommendations (Grenfell, Manchester Arena), that lead to check lists and requirements of things the Service had to do, could the Service end up in a form of institutional complacency, that if the checklist had been done, the Service had done what was expected of it. What do officers think that the Authority and the Service should be doing to make sure that as well as working through these inquiries and actions, it also creates the space to step back and challenge itself around what else does the Service need to be worrying about, what was on the risk horizon that had not been seen yet, rather than check list complacency.

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer advised that there had been a lot of action plans that had come through over recent years, and there was a tendency to work through these action plans and there was a vulnerability there. The day after the Grenfell fire, officers were already thinking, what does this mean for the Service, getting to know those risks really forensically and upping the risk in terms of anything over six storeys, looking at equipment, policies and procedures and how staff were trained, how it was assured and how to exercise it. There was a year of thematic exercising, working in high rises. It’s about the organisation and the Authority giving staff the confidence to make those decisions.

 

The Chief Fire Officer advised Members that exercising was a key part of making sure the Service was operationally confident and competent and going forward the ethos was the Service could never be complacent about it, there has got to be a continual learning cycle.

 

RESOLVED –

 

That the report be noted.

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