Agenda item

To consider item 13

The Group Commander Technical advised Members that this report outlined the Service’s approach to Operational Learning and Assurance, accounting for local, sector and multi-agency events from which it can identify and implement improvement. Focus of the report was to update on progress against two significant inquiry recommendations, those being Grenfell Tower and Manchester Arena. It was incumbent on the Service to take learning from all areas and ensure it was embedded into the Service.

As a result of the Grenfell Tower inquiry, the Service undertook a significant amount of work to enhance how it managed the risk associated with large, complex buildings across the service delivery functions of protection and prevention and response, and much of the work had been done in collaboration with partners to ensure operational alignment. 46 actions were adopted from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase One report, and to date 37 were complete, with 9 outstanding actions. Of those 9, 5 sat with Thames Valley Fire Control Service (TVFCS) and 3 of the remaining 4 had been adopted into the Command Support Project, being run by Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service.

The second external inquiry was the Manchester Arena Inquiry. The Manchester Arena Inquiry made 149 recommendations, and those recommendations would be incorporated into a dedicated improvement plan. Following a gap analysis, 50 of the recommendations were for standalone fire and rescue services, and 24 apply across multi agency environment (including fire and rescue services). Officers had been working closely with Thames Valley fire and rescue service colleagues and also partners within the local resilience forum to ensure there was an appropriate and cohesive response to the recommendations.

Monthly Thames Valley Manchester Arena Inquiry Working Group meetings commenced with representations from the three Thames Valley fire and rescue services and Thames Valley Fire Control Service colleagues. A single Action Plan had been created to ensure alignment in progress and response to recommendations. The Action Plan delivery was monitored by the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Strategic Group which feeds into the Local Resilience Forum.

In terms of what can be seen being delivered already, there was a new set of Marauding Terrorist Attack Joint Operating Principles being implemented for the three blue light services. The primary intent being emergency responders making quicker interventions of these kind of scenarios or incidents. Secondly the triage system, with ‘Ten Second Triage’ had been signed off by NHS England and was now in the process of being implemented into the various trusts across the country. This was designed to be utilised by all emergency responders as a single system.

A Member asked about the funding within the report.

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised Members there was an initial fairly crude distribution of funding based on the number of high rise buildings in each different Service area, to help with some of the recommendations. What that became was Protection Grant Funding and the Service still received an annual allocation.

At the recent NFCC Prevention and Protection Conference, the expectation was that funding would continue for another year, possibly two, but ultimately the Home Office position would be over a period of time, the Service should be able to build its capability, to meet its needs within its current base budget.

The Chairman asked what Members should be concerned about, where not enough progress was being made, or where additional support should be provided.

The Group Commander Technical advised that some of the actions from the Grenfell Tower report not being met was more of a national picture. The Service was waiting for national operational guidance for the control room function, and some of the actions could not be completed until it comes out. It could delay the process.

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised Members that from an operational perspective, the Service was in much better shape than it was pre Grenfell in terms of some of the learning recommendations. There was at least one example in Buckinghamshire where the Responsible Person was not doing what they needed to do quickly enough, and the longer that continued, the longer people were at risk, including firefighters, should the Service get called to such incidents.

From a Manchester Arena perspective, the Service was doing a lot of great work, although there was currently a national representative body challenge around the role of a firefighter and non-specialist response.

The Chairman asked, about the Responsible Person, and how Members could help to address it.

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that engagement and lobbying MPs to push the matter as strongly as possible in Parliament. Also, influencing with some of the local authority CEOs to give support as key partners. Their influence would be really helpful putting pressure on building companies to speed things up.

The Chairman advised that he and the Chief Fire Officer were due to meet with all the local MP’s over the next few weeks, and asked if officers could provide a briefing paper of what was needed.

A Member asked if there was anything specific from the Manchester Arena Inquiry that could be implemented at Milton Keynes Stadium.

The Group Commander Technical advised that some of the recommendations within the report do not apply to fire and rescue services but to stadiums in terms of their preparedness for this kind of incident and the contractors they employ to staff those events. Where it crosses over would be the site specific risk information the Service holds. One of those would be stretchers and having multiple stretchers available and how the Service would store that information and how firefighters would access the facilities already on site.

A Member asked that when events take place by a promoter, for example at the Milton Keynes Bowl, was the Service informed of these events.

The Group Commander Technical advised that the Service was advised and engaged at the earliest opportunity and one of the outcomes of the Manchester Arena Inquiry was the introduction of operational response plans which were shared with all partners.

RESOLVED –

That the report be noted.